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Karl  Popper  famously  opposed  Marxism in  general  and  its  philosophical  core  –  the 
Marxist dialectic – in particular. As a progressive thinker, Popper saw in dialectic a source of 
dogmatism damaging to philosophy and political theory. Popper had summarized his views on 
dialectic in an article that was first delivered in 1937 and subsequently republished as a chapter of 
his book (2002, pp. 419-451), where he accuses Marxist dialecticians of not tolerating criticism. 
Ironically, Popper’s view that all Marxist dialecticians dogmatically dismiss any criticism 
of dialectic by claiming that their opponents do not understand dialectic makes his position no 
less dogmatic. Indeed, any attempt to criticise Popper’s views on dialectics would be seen only as 
an additional example of responses by “dogmatic dialecticians”, making his theory essentially 
immune. This completely prevents dialecticians from being able to criticise Popper’s views. This 
is exactly the opposite of what the great philosopher wanted. Therefore, for the sake of “anti-
dogmatic science” it is desirable and even necessary to defend dialectic.
In  this  work  I  address  several  central  points  about  Popper’s  criticism  of  Marxist 
(materialist) dialectic. In particular, I (a) analyse Popper’s definition of dialectic as the dialectic 
triad (thesis,  anti-thesis,  synthesis)  and contrast  it  with a notion of dialectic  as  a much more 
complex concept which occurs in dialectical materialism today, where the triad represents only 
one of the aspects; (b) compare dialectic with the trial and error method; (c) discuss the place of 
dialectic  amongst  valid  scientific  methods:  Does  dialectic  accept  logical  contradictions;  (e) 
discuss lessons dialecticians should learn from Popper’s criticism.
I will test my arguments as to their constructiveness and will demonstrate explicitly the 
nature of my disagreement with Popper -  thereby trying to avoid the “dogmatic dialecticians” 
response as much as possible. 
Progressive, anti-dogmatic science is critical – criticism is its very life.
Karl Popper
I. Introduction: Popper and dialectic today
Today.  the  validity  of  many  Popper's  ideas  and  claims  are  somewhat  controversial. 
However,  they are more relevant than ever.  Rethinking Popper means reassessing his 
ideas in the present day context.  During the last decade of his life, Popper had a chance 
to enjoy an apparent refutation of the communist ideology. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union was met with euphoria and was accompanied by an expectation that the world will 
become a better place. Yet, today we realize that global political and social dynamics is 
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much  more  complicated.  Ideologies  are  exploited  by  political  regimes:  and  so  the 
Stalinist terror and collapse of the Soviet block cannot be accepted as refutations of the 
communist  dream any more  than the  crimes  of  the  Inquisition can be  accepted  as  a 
refutation of the existence of God. Today we also understand that the idea of democracy 
was and is exploited. The US intervention and support for the overthrow of the elected 
socialist  coalition  of  Salvador  Allende in  Chile  in  1973  and its  replacement  by the 
military dictatorship of General Pinochet is no different, in its essence, from the 1969 
Soviet  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia  and  suppression  of  Alexander  Dubček's  liberal 
reforms. The paranoid fear of alternative world views, and the fight for influence, power 
and  resources  were  a  real  force  behind  both  these  actions  and  the  colour  of  the 
ideological umbrella did not really matter after all.
Notwithstanding the above, the idea of communist was associated with Stalinism 
and totalitarianism in general and therefore discredited; and dialectical materialism was 
discredited together with it. It should be stressed, that nothing in dialectical materialism, 
as a philosophical system, implies communism. However, the notion of dialectic has been 
politicised to such an extent that now defending dialectic  is associated with being an 
enemy of freedom and democracy. The roots of this sad unfair predicament lie already in 
Popper's 1937 article. 
The purpose of this work is by addressing the Popper's original 1937 critique to 
reassess the notion and the place of the dialectical approach in today's philosophy. My 
aim is neither to launch a personal attack on Popper now, thirteen years after his death, 
nor to discuss the state of the dialectical  approach during his life.  My aim is,  rather, 
reassess our view of dialectic and its suitability as a valid philosophical and scientific 
approach today.
I  am  convinced,  that  the  rehabilitation  of  dialectic  is  a  very  important  task. 
Modern  science –  science of  complex adaptive  systems,  non-linear  phenomena,  self-
organisation, etc. needs an adequate philosophical framework and methodology, which is 
still absent today.  And dialectical materialism deserves attention as a serious potential 
candidate for such a framework. It was developed, especially in the Soviet tradition, as an 
incredibly  systematic  philosophical  system.  This  system certainly  deserves  very deep 
unbiased  analysis.  Thus,  it  would  be  interesting  to  analyse  the  connections  between 
modern  dialectical  approach  and  relevant  on-going  studies  on  emergence,   process  
ontology, etc.
It would be too ambitious in this article to address the question of the general 
applicability of the dialectical approach to all processes in the world in this article. Here I 
focus on the applicability of the methodological aspects of the dialectical approach to 
philosophy of science.
  II. Dialectic and dogmatism
Popper  accused  Marxists  of  dogmatism.  Ironically,  Popper’s  remark  of  how Marxist 
dialecticians dismiss any criticism of dialectic by claiming that their opponents do not 
understand  dialectic  makes  his  position  no  less  dogmatic.  If,  for  example,  one  was 
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claiming that a particular argument of Popper is incorrect, because it does not take into 
account such and such aspects of dialectic, Popper would accuse one in dogmatism. This 
completely prevents dialecticians from being able to criticise Popper’s views.  Indeed, 
how can one defend a view if not by trying to demonstrate where the opponents argument 
is flawed. Any such attempt would be dismissed on the grounds of dogmatism. Very 
uncritical, is it? This is exactly the opposite of Popper's critical attitude.
Although,  I  of  course agree that  there  might  be dialecticians  with a  dogmatic 
view, and do not wish to defend them, I would like to stress that Popper's remark, which 
criticises  them,  cannot  be  directed  to  dialectic  per  se.  Thus,  that  aspect  of  Popper's 
criticism is not constructive. It does not add anything to the content of the argument. A 
similar situation would arise if Popper, for example, attacked the theory of relativity by 
dismissing the postulate of invariance of the speed of light. Most physicists would not 
accept  his  claim  and  perhaps  a  number  of  them  would  accuse  Popper  of  not 
understanding relativity. Does it make the theory of relativity dogmatic? Surely not.
It should also be mentioned that there are Marxists who have adopted an anti-
dogmatic position, like the modern theoretician of Marxism, Bertell Ollman (2003)
Dialectics is not a rock-ribbed triad of thesis-antithesis-synthesis that serves  
as an all-purpose explanation; nor does it provide a formula that enables us  
to  prove  or  predict  anything;  nor  is  it  the  motor  force  of  history.  The 
dialectic,  as  such,  explains  nothing,  proves  nothing,  predicts  nothing  and  
causes nothing to happen. Rather, dialectics is a way of thinking that brings  
into focus the full range of changes and interactions that occur in the world. 
                                                                                                                 
III. Dialectic and dialectic triad
Popper gives the following definition of dialectic (Popper, 2002, p. 421):
Dialectic ... is a theory which maintains that something – for instance, human 
thought – develops in a way characterised by the so-called dialectic triad:  
thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis.
This is, however, by no means the definition of dialectic as materialist dialecticians see it 
today.  
Dialectics  is  the  method  of  reasoning  which  aims  to  understand  things  
concretely  in  all  their  movement,  change  and  interconnection,  with  their  
opposite and contradictory sides in unity.  
                                                         [on-line Encyclopaedia of Marxism]
Following Engels (1946) the modern materialist dialectic is associated with the following 
laws :
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Laws of Dialectic
 The law of interpenetration of opposites (unity and struggle of opposites) 
 The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa
 The law of negation of the negation
What Popper refers to appears to be the last law – the law of the negation of the negation.  
Popper,  therefore,  identifies  dialectic  only with one of its  aspects,   leaving all  others 
aside. This fact is very important since the universal applicability of this law is subject to 
controversy  amongst  dialecticians  from  different  schools,  especially  in  the  Soviet 
tradition of Dialectical Materialism - “Diamat” - (Orlov, 1991, pp. 326-7). 
The aim of dialectic is to study things in their own being and movement via the 
connection of opposites. Materialist dialectic is a study of connections, it is able to grasp 
complex types of connections, e.g. interplay of opposites, and the most complex type of 
connections – development (Introduction to Philosophy, 1989, p. 106). Thus, materialist 
dialectic is a theory about development, and development is a central concept of dialectic.
Studying development in its general terms becomes more and more important and 
relevant today, when theories of complex systems and processes in biology, social and 
physical  sciences,  e.g.  synergetics,  have  gained  general  recognition.  The  topic  of 
development is directly relevant to the argument between emergence and reductionism in 
philosophy of  science.  Thus,  the concept  of  dialectics  as  a  theory of  development  is 
crucial in the next section, where we compare dialectic and the trial and error method. It 
is  essential  to  point  out  that  the examples in  the following sections are not  given to 
support the view that all processes of development in nature are dialectical, as Engels 
argued in Anti-Dühring and in Dialectics of Nature. This question, though fundamental in 
dialectical  methodology,  remains beyond the scope of the present article.  What these 
examples  ought  show,  though,  is  that  the  development  of  our  scientific  ideas  and 
hypotheses about the physical phenomena described in these examples can only make 
sense if analysed through the eyes of dialectic.
     
IV. Trial and Error Method (T&E) versus Dialectic (D).
Popper presents the trial and error method (T&E) as a universal way in which human 
thought in general and scientific development in particular occurs, and compares it with 
dialectic  (D).  According to Popper,  dialectical  approaches,  though applicable  in some 
situations,  do not hold in general,  so although dialectics satisfactorily describes some 
developments,  it  is  not  consistent  with  others;  and  he  supports  his  claim  by  four 
scenarios.
a) When the Thesis and the Antithesis do not lead to a Synthesis. Instead, one of them is 
simply eliminated. 
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b) Many independent theses can be offered, therefore T&E has wider application than D 
which does not account for that.
c) The Thesis does not produce the Antithesis. Rather our critical attitude produces the 
Antithesis, and sometimes the Antithesis is not produced at all.
d) In the case when the Synthesis is produced, it is not simply a construction built merely 
of material supplied by Thesis and Antithesis and preserving the best parts of both. If will 
contain some entirely new idea.
    
The dialectical interpretation, even where it may be applicable, will hardly ever  
help to develop thought by its suggestion that a synthesis should be constructed  
out of the ideas contained in a thesis and an antithesis.  
(Popper, 2002, p.424)
I would like to start from the last point, d), since it is the most crucial one. As we have 
already seen in Section II, development is an essential part of the dialectical approach 
with all attributes associated to it: Including completely new content that emerges as a 
result of a development. Thus, Popper completely misinterprets dialectic and accuses it of 
not  being  exactly  what  it  is.  Dialectical  interpretation  does  promote  development 
precisely  because  Synthesis  is  not  just  a  construction  from the  material  supplied  by 
Thesis and Antithesis.  
For the same very reason, the situations described in a), b) and c) do not promote 
development.  They  describe  changes  which  are  not  associated  with  development. 
Nothing new emerges – all was contained already in the thesis or the antithesis1. Thus, I 
reach conclusions radically different to Popper's. Trial and Error method and dialectical 
approach do not compete; for those aspects of the Trial and Error method which are not 
shared by Dialectic cannot account for development. 
V. Dialectic versus Formal Logic
Now we arrive at a crucial point - Popper's core argument against the dialectical method 
in science. According to Popper, dialectic accepts contradictions, it violates the “law of 
(exclusion)  of  contradiction”.  And  since  accepting  contradictions  will  ruin  science, 
dialectic  is  dangerous.  Contradictions  for  Popper  are  logical  contradictions,  therefore 
dialectic is opposed to formal logic. It should be noted that the topic of the relationship 
between formal logic and dialectic was often addressed in the Soviet Diamat literature 
[for example, there is a section devoted to the issue in Introduction to Philosophy (1989, 
1 Zuzana Parusnikova has pointed out, that refutation of, say, a thesis does not eliminate it or erase it, so 
to speak. The very fact of it being refuted leaves an imprint on our background knowledge. Although, 
this point deserves farther consideration it is not clear at this stage whether it accounts for emergence of 
a qualitatively new.   
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p.151)  titled  “Dialectic  and  logical  contradictions”]  as  well  as  in  Western  Marxist 
writings (Ollman, 2003, p. 11). 
The main objection against Popper's conclusion was systematized and put forward 
by Maurice Cornforth (1977, chapter III). Here I summarise the key claims: 
a) Dialectic does not suggest that the laws of formal logic can be broken or set aside. 
b) Dialectic is not opposed to logic: rather, it is opposed to metaphysics2.
c) Negation (antithesis) is not in logical contradiction with the thesis,  because dialectic 
treats things in their interconnections-the idea can be best expressed in Cornforth's own 
words (1977, p. 86): 
 Of course, if you ignore the ways things are connected-if you ignore, say,  
those connections of things which lead to an existing state of affairs  
generating its own “negation” - you will reach wrong conclusions. That  
unfortunate result will not then be due to your respect for formal logic, but to  
your disrespect for real connections.  
In  this  article  we  specialize  in  philosophy  of  science,  and  therefore  contradictions 
mentioned  above  should  be  regarded  as  contradictions  between  rival  scientific 
hypotheses. 
Formal logic studies and classifies statements and propositions. In particular, it 
distinguishes between those proposition that are true and those that are false. However, 
the formal logic itself is empty of content. When it deals, say, with two propositions A 
and  ¬A,  it  asserts  that  they  both  cannot  be  true.  But  formal  logic  is  hitherto  best 
developed  for  non-vague sentences  and  propositions  (which  it  can  supply  with 
unambiguous  semantic  content),  whereas  everyday  propositions,  and  also  scientific 
hypotheses, are normally too vague to fit into this type. Indeed, the topic of  vagueness 
was extensively studied [see, for example Keefe and Smith (1997)]. Keefe and Smith 
write (1997, p.2) 
Suppose Tek is borderline tall. It seems that the unclarity about whether he is  
tall is not merely epistemic. For a start,  no amount of further information  
about  his  exact  height  (and  the  heights  of  others)  could  help  us  decide  
whether he is tall. Plausibly, there is no fact of the matter here about which 
we are ignorant: rather, it is indeterminate  whether Tek is tall. And arguably  
this indeterminacy amounts to the sentence “Tek is tall” being neither true  
nor  false,  which  violates  the  classical  principle  of  bivalence.  The  law of  
excluded middle similarly comes into question: “either Tek is tall or he is  
not” seems untrue.  
As  a  result,  logical  incompatibility  of  propositions,  corresponding  to  rival  scientific 
hypotheses, has to be set outside of formal logic. 
2 Here the term 'metaphysics' is used  in its traditional Marxists meaning. 
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The fallacy in Popper's approach consists of loading two propositions/scientific 
hypotheses with a certain content  a priori, thereby asserting that the two are logically 
exclusive, and thus arriving at a conclusion that any attempt to reconcile between the two 
in the form of synthesis will  accept logical contradiction. This idea perhaps was best 
summarized by Ollman's (2003) 
The common sense notion of contradiction is that it applies to ideas about  
things  and  not  to  things  themselves,  that  it  is  a  logical  relation  between 
propositions ("If I claim 'X,' I can't at the same time claim 'not X' "), and not  
a real relation existing in the world. 
 
In other words, formal logic deals with notions or aspects of things abstracted from the 
real things themselves.   
Thus, when we consider a hypothesis,  even a most simple one, about the  real 
world its very content depends on our inquiry, on other hypotheses, on the history of our 
views on the problem and so on3. Its content is, in as sense, a product of the process of 
the inquiry itself. And thus it is a (“metaphysical”) mistake to think of hypotheses – or 
indeed any proposition - in isolation from each other and from the process of our inquiry. 
When Popper thinks of things (scientific  hypotheses)  and their  properties  in isolation 
from each other, it leads to a formal counter-posing of “is” and “is not”. We can illustrate 
it with Popper's own simple example 
(Thesis) The sun is shining now 
(Anti-thesis) The sun is not shining now 
At first  sight,  these  two proposition  are  evidently  contradictory.  However,  this  is  an 
illusion – we are misled by formal linguistic counter-posing of “is” and “is not”. This is 
exactly the trap we should not fall into. Let us conduct a simple  Gedankenexperiment. 
We will phone our friend around the world and (after apologizing to some of them for 
waking them up) ask to look out of the window and tell us whether the sun is shining now 
or not. Very soon we will discover that the Sun  is shining in Madrid, Florence, Cairo, 
Kiev, but it is also not shining in Tokyo, Sidney, London, Amsterdam, etc. 
Thus,  we  will  realize  that  for  us  as  observers  at  the  surface  of  the  Earth  the 
meaning of attributing the property of shining to the Sun has a spacial/geographical and 
temporal aspects. We can go out to space where we will discover that our everyday sense 
of Sun's shining has a subjective aspect – Sun shining when and where it is shining for 
us. We will find out that objectively Sun started to shine, i.e. emit radiation into the outer 
space,  and hopefully will do so in the foreseeable future. 
This toy example is trivial, but it makes the point. We started from two simple 
hypotheses about sunshine, but in the process of our inquiry we acquired a lot of new 
3 It  is  well  know that  the socio-cultural-historical  aspects  of  the scientific  progress were extensively 
elaborated by Thomas Kuhn is his famous work. I do not go into the disagreement between Kuhn and 
Popper  here  in  order  not  to draw away our attention from the main point.  For the purpose of our 
discussion it is enough to say that a particular hypotheses must not be abstracted/detached from the real 
object or  the process, and should not be schematized, thereby filling it with a priori content.     
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content. We learned that sunshine can be interpreted as a property attributed to the Sun 
alone (independent of its observation) or as a characteristic of an observer's experience, it 
differs at various points of space and time, i.e. it has spatio-temporal characteristics – the 
Sun might shine at (x1, t1), but not shine at (x2, t2). These conclusions are full of a new 
content that was not in the original propositions before. We might say that our knowledge 
has developed into a new stage. 
Thus, the original propositions are not in logical contradiction at all. One might 
wonder, though, how I will cope with the following example     
(Thesis) The sun is shining in Cambridge, England at 1:30 pm on Wednesday, 
17/10/07, above the Market Square
(Anti-thesis) The sun is not shining in Cambridge, England, at 1:30 pm on 
Wednesday, 17/10/07, above the Market Square
These two surely are mutually exclusive. Of course they are! But if we conduct a similar 
inquiry here then we will just refute either one or the other. Formal logic will be saved. 
However, no new content will be produced – we will just assert which one is true. We 
knew all along that the Sun cannot both shine and not shine in the particular place at a 
particular time. The above example supports an interesting assertion that real scientific 
progress depends on vagueness and that formal logic is scientifically unimportant in this 
sense. 
One might be satisfied by the above example, but I feel it necessary to discuss the 
following, still quite simple, yet more “scientific” example [see Cornforth (p. 96)].  Let 
us imagine the following hypothetical situation. We are chemists, and in our laboratory 
we have a test-tube with newly discovered substance, called “oxygen”, about which we 
do not know anything yet. We are going to test a scientific hypothesis that  oxygen is a  
gas.  This is our thesis. We immediately arrive at its negative version, namely oxygen is  
not a liquid.  We subject  oxygen to various tests and soon discover that under certain 
conditions it does become a liquid. This conclusion that  oxygen can be a liquid  is our 
antithesis or negation. The result of our study will be that oxygen is a gas under certain 
normal conditions of temperature  and pressure. This is the synthesis or negation of the 
negation – oxygen can be a gas after all. Thus 
(Thesis) Oxygen is a gas
(Anti-thesis) Oxygen is a liquid 
are in logical contradiction if one ignores oxygen as something that can be in process of 
change, considers concepts of gas and liquid in isolation, ignore their interconnection. 
This  example  demonstrates  how  scientists  reduce  vagueness  and  sharpen  scientific 
concepts by reconciling thesis and antithesis. 
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Now we are ready to see that the T&E scheme imposed on the development of 
scientific theories by Popper is much too restrictive. So restrictive, that in fact, using only 
trial-and-error method science could not make any progress at all. The core problem is 
that  the  scientific  conceptual  framework  imposes  logical  incompatibility  of  certain 
hypotheses. Thus, for example, in the framework of our classical experience our intuition 
about the world imposed rigid restrictions on properties classical objects can possess. In 
particular, the incompatibility of the corpuscular and the wave nature of an object: any 
classical object can be either a wave or a particle. (The discussion about the corpuscular 
and wave nature of light has a long history and became, so to speak, a classical example 
in philosophy of science). Let us try for a moment to reason without the baggage of that 
classical framework. The two (potential) aspects of an object's being (properties), namely 
“an object is a wave” and “an object is a particle” are not yet incompatible. One has to 
abstract  them from the  real  object  to  make them logically  incompatible,  i.e.  identify 
“being a particle” with “not being a wave”. Following Popper's T&E method would mean 
that every time a scientist considers the two rival hypotheses about the nature of light and 
is going to test them in the laboratory, she would refute one of them, depending on the 
nature of the experiment. 
The history of quantum physics has proved this approach to be radically wrong. 
Instead, physicists arrived at the novel concept of  wave-particle duality. The additional 
powerful example is the superposition principle in quantum mechanics, i.e. when to the 
same quantum object can be attributed a state of being, for example, in two different 
locations at once. If physicists followed Popper's T&E scheme, they would never escape 
from the loop of logical incompatibility of the different, apparently contradictory aspects, 
and would never make any progress towards one of the most incredible scientific theories 
in  the  history  of  mankind.  This  example  differs  from the  one  given  in  the  previous 
paragraph in that it demonstrated how scientists create new concepts. 
Thus,  inherent  contradictions  are  seen  by  dialectical  materialism  as  the  main 
source of development.  But they are not logical contradictions. They are contradictions 
in the operational sense. They are contrastive sides or aspects of one real object or thing4, 
but not contrary (i.e. mutually exclusive) in the logical sense.
I  would like to finish my discussion of the relation between formal  logic and 
dialectic by the following, and to my view very important,  remark. Sometimes in the 
literature [e.g. see Novack (1969), Stavinsky (2003)] dialectic is presented as a kind of a 
new logic, as a counter to the conventional formal logic, and a term dialectical logic is 
even used to describe this new type logic. I strongly oppose this view exactly for the 
reasons  given  in  this  section.   The  term  dialectal  logic leads  exactly  to  the  sort  of 
confusion that is presented in Popper's treatment of the problem. It implies or at least 
creates the impression that formal logic should be replaced by dialectic. As I have argued 
here, formal logic and dialectic belong to the different domains and must not be treated as 
potential replacements of each other.  Maurice Cornforth very correctly points out that 
4 It is important  to mention that these contradictions are not of the predicative nature either. Formally, 
several contradictory properties can be trivially attributed to an object due to the predicative tension, 
e.g. milk is white and is (at room temperature) wet, and the property of being white is not the property 
of being wet. This is, obviously, not what dialectic means by 'opposites'.     
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'the laws of formal logic are of absolute validity, any form of statement which sets them 
aside becomes thereby incoherent and inconsistent' (p.86).
VI. Summary
The aim of this work was neither to present a (brief) review or study of modern dialectic 
nor to discuss the applicability of the dialectical approach to all development processes in 
Nature5. The aim of this work was to reassess the relevance of Popper's criticism of the 
applicability  of the dialectical  approach to the development  of scientific  theories  and 
scientific thought. I have presented and discussed the main points of  Popper's criticism 
of dialectic and have concluded that it is unsound. I argued that Popper has significantly 
contributed to the link that was unfortunately created between dialectical materialism as a 
philosophical-scientific system and communist ideology. The latter found itself misused 
by several totalitarian regimes. Popper politicized dialectic helping to build prejudices 
against it. In the interest of anti-dogmatic science these prejudice should be dissolved. 
Thus,  this work is an attempt to rehabilitate dialectic  by addressing Popper's  original 
criticism.    
And finally,  I would like to mention the main lessons that dialecticians should 
learn from Popper's criticism in the light of my previous discussion. It is important that 
theoreticians of dialectical materialism will do more to depoliticise it. In particular, they 
ought to convey that its application to the society and history, i.e. historical materialism,  
should  not  make  any  exact  social  predictions.  In  addition,  the  dialectical  approach 
certainly suffers from its apparent applicability to “everything”, the problem that raised 
the most  serious objections  from Popper.  Indeed, it  should be clarified how dialectic 
classifies and differentiates different processes and types of connections in the world.   
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